Why the Insaafian Dream is not the Solution

Why the Insaafian Dream is not the Solution

Published in The News, September 25, 2014. 

Let me begin by admitting that I agree with Imran Khan. Our political establishment, by which I mean our major political parties, is full of people who have no respect for the rule of law, who treat government office as their own private business and use the police like their own personal armies. These are mostly people who, absent media cameras, would scoff at the suggestion that they are “servants” of the people. This must change. But, none of this justifies the politics of that urban, middle to upper class segment of PTI’s base that we have come to call Insaafians.

The politics of Insaafians is based on a very simple premise: Pakistan’s problems can all be traced to the fact that corrupt, morally bankrupt politicians are in control of government. Their lack of moral character is mostly attributed to their “feudal” and “uneducated” backgrounds. By contrast, Imran Khan is an incorruptible leader with a morally unassailable character. If such a person were to lead Pakistan, they argue, Pakistan would be transformed, politics would be purified of corruption, rule of law would rein supreme, and Pakistan would be on its way to becoming a leader in the world of nations, as it rightly should be.

Let’s suspend disbelief for a minute and accept that Imran Khan is in fact as unimpeachable as Insaafians say.  The question still remains, how will one man’s moral character lead to the kind of “revolution” that they envision? Obviously, a functioning government requires more than one moral person or even a few. It requires a whole cadre of ministers and a diverse array of bureaucrats and functionaries. How will PTI get these individuals to act so morally? Insaafians largely respond in two ways. First, they say that Khan would dismiss people who do not meet his high moral standards. Second, they say that the great leader will become an example for all other politicians and will inspire them to act in accordance with the highest of moral standards. This combination of top down party discipline and trickle-down morality will purify politics of corruption and vice.

PTI’s rhetoric of “revolution” belies the profoundly conservative nature of this perspective. What we have here is the vision of a top-heavy and centrally controlled administrative apparatus tasked with moral uplift and reform. This vision of a paternal state ushering the country into modernity is hardly new. It has been the primary justification for army rule in Pakistan since our founding. Whatever the ideological differences between the regimes of Ayub Khan , Zia-ul-Haq, and Parvez Musharraf, they all converged on the idea that civilian politicians could not be trusted to govern Pakistan because they lacked the appropriate moral character, especially discipline and honor, and that Pakistan’s progress depended on standing above the corruption of civilian politics. Similarly, Insaafians insist that our politicians are incorrigible and politics itself must be transcended.

When PTI leaders claim that they have inspired a whole generation of youth to participate in the political process, people who otherwise see politics as a filthy vocation, they mask the fact that what they have actually inspired is a kind of anti-politics that treats all political negotiation, dealing and bargaining as a sign of corruption and immorality.  When one begins with such an absolutist and purist vision of what politics ought to be, the solution can only be a centralized and authoritarian state. Insaafians dream of a state governed by “educated” urban professionals—a technocracy—who, unlike “feudals,” are not only more efficient but also morally upright. The argument goes that these technocrats, untainted by politics, will faithfully serve the people and usher in a “naya” Pakistan.

This discourse about the moral vice of our politicians elides the real problem of governance in Pakistan, which is not that our politicians lack moral character (why should they be less moral than politicians elsewhere?) but that the majority of Pakistanis lack the capacity to hold them accountable. This lack of accountability springs from the vast inequalities of wealth and power that structure the relationship between Pakistan’s elites (business, landed, and military) and the rest of the population, including the middle class.  Insofar as PTI’s leadership draws from the same pool of privileged and powerful people (and it does!), there is no reason to believe PTI will be any more accountable than any other party.

The passion that drives Insaafians is certainly real. The problems that Insaafians identify in the political establishment are real enough, too. But the Insaafian vision of a moral state, purified of politics and politicians, is not the solution. Certainly, one can argue that PTI will govern better than PML-N or PPP, but this is a far more humble claim than “revolution.” It need not come with the sanctimony we have come to expect from Insaafians.

But, there is still promise here. If the Insaafians can channel their passion into the difficult work of organizing people and building up local institutions and, more specifically, organizing cross-class alliances (lower to middle class) that can stand as a challenge to elite power and privilege, then we might still find ourselves on the road to accountability and a more substantive democracy. For this to happen, however, Insaafians must abandon the framework in which the problem of politics in Pakistan is reducible to the corrupt moral character of our politicians and instead focus on the structures of power and inequality that allow elites, all elites, to evade accountability. This requires first that we awaken from the dream of the great savior, but maybe this is like asking for a naya PTI.